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LONG-TERM ENERGY FUTURES: 
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY 
BY ARNULF GRUBLER (I) 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Laxenburg,Austria 
The paper briefly reviews the results of a 5-year study conducted by !!ASA jointly with 
the World Energy Council (WEC) on long-term energy perspectives. After 
summarizing the study's main findings, the paper addresses the crucial role of 
technological change in the evolution of long-term energy fi1tures and in responding to 
key long-term uncertainties in the domains of energy demand growth, economics, as 
well as environmental protection. Based on most recent empirical and methodological 
findings, long-term dynamics of technological change portray a number of distinct 
features that need to be taken account of in technology and energy policy. First, success 
of innovation efforts and ultimate outcomes of technological change are uncertain. 
Second, new, improved technologies are not a free good, but require continued 
dedicated efforts. Third, technological knowledge (as resulting from R&D and 
accumulation of experience, i.e. technological learning) exhibits characteristics of 
(uncertain) increasing returns. Forth, due to innovation - dijfosion lags, technological 
interdependence, and infrastructure needs (network externalities), rates of change in 
large-scale energy systems are necessarily slow. This implies acting sooner rather than 
later as a contingency policy to respond to long-term social, economic and 
environmental uncertainties, most notably possible climate change. Rather than 
picking technological (( winners » the results of the JIASA-WEC scenario studies are 
seen most appropriate to guide technology and R&D portfolio analysis. Nonetheless, 
robust persistent patterns of technological change invariably occur across all scenarios. 
Examples of promising groups of technologies are given. The crucial importance of 
meeting long-term energy demand in developing countries, assuring large-scale 
infrastructure investments, maintaining a strong and diversified R&D portfolio, as 
well as to devise new institutional mechanisms for technology development and 
difjitsion for instance through the flexibility and Clean Development mechanisms of 
the Kyoto Protocol are highlighted The paper concludes with some methodological 
lessons to capture the essence of above outlined characteristics of technological change in 
energy models and long-term scenarios. 
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I. - INTRODUCTION 
This paper summarizes a five-year study on 
long-term global and regional energy pers-
pectives conducted jointly by the 
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) and the World Energy 
Council (WEC) reported in detail in 
Nakicenovic et al. (1998). A distinguishing 
feature of the study arising from its long-
term (2050 and beyond) time horizon is 
that technological change emerges as a key 
determinant of long-term energy systems 
development. Resulting uncertainties are 
explored through a scenario approach high-
lighting the critical role of near - to 
medium-term R&D and investment deci-
sions into resource extraction, conversion, 
and end-use technologies in yielding alter-
native outcomes in terms of future resource 
availability, energy supply structures as well 
as environmental impacts. 
(I) Environmentalft Compatible Energ)' Strategies Project, 
//ASA,A-2361 Laxenburg.Austria. E-mail: gruebler@iiasa.ac.at 
An abridged version of this paper is presented at the IAEEJAEE 
Conference « Technological Progress and the Energ)' 
Challenges » September 30 - October I, 1999, Paris. Unless 
specified otherwise all graphical material presented in this 
paper is from Nakicenovic et al., 1998. Further details on the 
studies results are also available directft through the internet 
(see Appendix E in Nakicenovic et al., 1998, (or details). 
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Section 2 gives an overview of the scenarios 
developed in the IIASA-WEC study and 
summarizes its main conclusions. Section 3 
briefly reviews theoretical and empirical 
aspects of technological change and how 
they were incorporated into the scenarios. 
Section 4 discusses patterns of technological 
change and resulting innovation opportuni-
ties that emerge from the IIASA-WEC sce-
nario study. Section 5 concludes, highligh-
ting policy implications in particular in the 
domains of R&D and niche market deve-
lopment (and their combination into 
RD&D, i.e. research, development and 
demonstration efforts) and technology 
portfolio diversification strategies. In 
essence, the picture that emerges is that the 
long-term future of the global energy sys-
tem is largely technologically constructed. 
Generic areas of technology innovation and 
diffusion opportunities can be identified. 
But at the same time, the dangers of« for-
getting by not doing » and of prematurely 
picking « winners » (that may turn out as 
« losers » later on) lurk large. 
11.-AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
llASA-WEC SCENARIOS 
The joint IIASA-WEC study developed 
three alternative cases of economic develop-
ment that are further subdivided into six 
scenarios of the long-term evolution of the 
global energy system. The principal focus 
for all cases is on the period up to 2050, but 
results are also presented to 2100. In brief, 
Case A presents a future of impressive tech-
nological improvements and consequent 
high economic growrh. Case B describes a 
future with less ambitious, though perhaps 
more realistic, technological improvements, 
and consequenrly more intermediate eco-
nomic growth. Case C presents a « rich and 
green » future. It includes both substantial 
technological progress and unprecedented 
international cooperation, including major 
resource transfers from North to South, 
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TABLE 1 - Summary of the three cases in 2050 and 2100 compared with 1990 
Case 
A B c 
High Middle Ecologically 
growth course driven 
Popularion, billion 
1990 5.3 5.3 5.3 
2050 IO.I JO.I JO.I 
2100 11.7 11.7 11.7 
GWP, trillion US (1990) $ 
1990 20 20 20 
2050 100 75 75 
2100 300 200 220 
Global primary energy intensiry 
improYement, percent per year Medium Low High 
1990 ra 2050 -0.9 -0.8 -1.4 
1990 ra 2100 -1.0 -0.8 -1.4 
Primary energy demand, Grae 
1990 9 9 9 
2050 25 20 14 
2100 45 35 21 
Resource availabiliry 
Fossil High Medium Low 
Non-fossil High Medium High 
Technology cosrs 
Fossil Low Medium High 
Non-fossil Low Medium Low 
Technology drnamics 
Fossil High Medium Medium 
Non-fossil High Medium High 
Environmental raxes No No Yes 
col emission consrraint No No Yes 
Ner carbon emissions, GrC 
1990 6 6 6 
2050 9-15 10 5 
2100 6-20 II 2 
Number of scenarios 3 I 2 
Abbreviatiom: GWP = gross world producr ; Grae = gigarans oil equivalent ; C01 = carbon dioxide ; 
GrC = gigarans of carbon 
centered explicirly on environmental pro-
tection and international equity. Key cha-
racteristics of the three cases are summari-
zed in Table 1. 
The key message from the long-term scena-
rio exercise is that it is easier to anticipate 
the forms in which energy will be deman-
ded by consumers in the future than to esti-
mate the absolute level of energy demand, 
or which energy sources will supply that 
demand. With increasing per capita 
incomes around the world, people will 
demand higher levels of more efficient, clea-
ner, and socially and environmentally less 
obtrusive energy services. Thus, one can see 
reasonably well the direction in which 
energy consumers are headed : high quality 
fuels, especially grid-dependent energy car-
. . . . 
ners are growmg m importance, mespewve 
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of the inherent uncerrainties involved in 
projecting future levels of income and 
energy demand (see Table 1). Thus, there is 
little variation in terms of the structure of 
final energy across the three Cases and their 
six Scenarios explored in the IIASA-WEC 
study (see Figure 1). That message is robust 
across a wide range of energy (supply) 
futures - from a tremendous expansion of 
coal production to strict limits, from a pha-
seout of nuclear energy to a substantial 
increase, from carbon emissions in 2100 
that are only one-third of today's levels to 
increase by more than a factor of three. Yet, 
for all the variation explored, all alternatives 
manage to match the expected demand pull 
for more flexible, more convenient, and 
cleaner forms of energy. The odds are thus 
good that consumers will indeed get what 
they want - flexibility, convenience, and 
cleanliness. Who their suppliers will be, 
which energy sources will be tapped, which 
infrastructural and technological means will 
be deployed emerges as main uncertainty of 
the future. Yet, it is a different kind of 
uncertainty : it is not exogenous to energy 
and technology policy and to resulting 
investment decisions, but rather being a 
marrer of deliberate choice. 
Another robust finding of the IIASA-WEC 
scenario study is that a major geopolitical 
energy shift towards the« South» is under-
way. Irrespective of the uncertainty in 
future levels of energy demand, future 
energy markets, including that of energy 
supply and end-use technologies move pro-
gressively to the currently developing coun-
tries. This raises the critical question of the 
international diffusion of new and advan-
ced energy supply and end-use technolo-
gies. Historically technological knowledge 
and innoYation capability (both in terms of 
supply « push » as well as demand « pull », 
i.e. R&D resources and market potentials), 
have resided mostly in the industrialized 
countries of the « North », and many 
decades will pass, before developing coun-
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FIGURE l -World final energy by from : solids, liquids, grids (in percent) 
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tries can build up comparable technological 
knowledge capital. 
Levels of future energy demand projected in 
the IIASA-WEC study are different across 
scenarios. Rates of economic growth, struc-
tural change, technological developments, 
and (environmental) policies are the four 
most important long run determinants of 
energy demand. (Energy prices are an 
important determinant for the short - to 
medium term. In the long-term however, 
technology and policy are more important 
determinants, although important feedback 
mechanisms, e.g. in form of induced tech-
nical change exist.) As a result, future levels 
of energy demand can vary widely, even for 
otherwise similar scenario characteristics in 
terms of population and level of economic 
development. The study expects a 1.5 to 3-
fold increase in global energy needs by 
2050, and a 2- to 5-fold increase by 2100 
(see Table 1 above). 
Current developing countries at present 
account for about one third of global pri-
mary energy use, while accounting for three 
quarters of global population. Over the 
long-term, the IIASA-WEC scenarios indi-
cate a dramatic shift. By 2050, developing 
countries account for between 57 to 67 per-
cent of global energy use, a share that could 
Grids 
(gas, district heat, 
electricity, hydrogen) 
2050 
A 
B 
c 
B 
c 
A 
2100 
increase to well over 80 percent towards the 
end of the 21st century. 
The changing geography of global energy 
use is illustrated in Figure 2 for Case B, the 
scenario of the IIASA-WEC study that 
deploys the most conservative assumptions 
concerning pace and level of development 
« catch up » of the developing countries. In 
Figure 2, the size of individual world 
regions are rescaled in proportion to their 
1990 primary energy use. As a result of the 
inequitable access to energy services, levels 
of energy use in the populous developing 
regions are comparatively small compared 
to the affiuent industrialized countries of 
the« North» (compare for instance the res-
pective energy sizes of Japan with that of the 
Sub-Indian and African continents in 
Figure 2). Over the long-term (2050 and 
beyond) however, current energy imba-
lances gradually are reduced and the 
« energy map » of the planet starts to 
resemble the geographical maps we are all 
familiar with. 
Ever since the classical studies of Tinbergen 
(1942) and Solow (1957) it is widely reco-
gnized that technological change drives pro-
ductivity growth and economic develop-
ment. Across all scenarios the role of tech-
nological progress is therefore critical, both 
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FIGURE 2 ·The changing geography of primary energy use, Case B 1990, 2050, and 2100 
Areas of world regions are proportional to 1990 levels of primary energy use 
Primary energy 2100 
Primary energy 1990 .._ __ ')_> _ _. 
at the level of the economy at large as well 
as at the level of the energy sector. 
According to the findings of the IIASA-
WEC study, it is the RD&D investments of 
the next few decades rhar will shape the 
technology options available after 2020. 
These near - to medium - term choices will 
determine which technology options will 
become available for widespread diffusion 
in the 21st century, and which options will 
be foreclosed due to a lack of anticipatory 
innovation and investment efforts. In 
essence, rhe study finds that future energy 
systems are technologically constn1cted. 
A significant finding of the IIASA-WEC 
study is therefore rhar there is a wide range 
of supply structures that can successfully 
march the persistent final energy trends 
depicted in Figure 1. Long-term global 
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energy futures are no longer seen as geolo-
gically preordained. The imminent resource 
scarcity as perceived in the 1970s did nor 
materialize. With continued exploration 
efforts and continued technological pro-
gress, accessible and affordable reserves have 
increased and this trend will continue to at 
least 2020. However, after 2020 all scena-
rios move away from their current reliance 
on conventional oil and gas. However, very 
different resource and technological options 
can be drawn upon to meet the drive to 
cleaner energy demanded by ever more 
affluent consumers worldwide. These are 
matters of choice : near-term R&D and 
investment decisions will drive the long-
term evolution of the global energy system 
into alternative, largely mutually exclusive 
directions. In the words of systems science : 
future developments of the energy sector 
portray features of path dependency (see e.g. 
Arthur, 1983 and 1989). This puts additio-
nal importance on near-term actions that 
can initiate long-term changes with techno-
logy and infrastructure investments being -
the most prominent examples. 
The possible long-term divergence of 
energy supply structures is illustrated in 
Figure 3. Each corner of the triangle in 
Figure 3 corresponds to a hypothetical 
situation in which all primary energy is sup-
plied by a single source : oil and gas at the 
top, coal on the left, and non-fossil sources 
(renewables and nuclear) on the right. In 
1990 their respective shares were 5 3 percent 
for oil and gas (measured against the grid 
lines with percentages shown on the right), 
24 percent for coal (measured against the 
grid lines with percentages on the left), and 
23 percent for non-fossil energy sources 
(measured against the grid lines with per-
centages at the bottom). Historically, the 
primary energy structure has evolved clock-
wise in two « grand transitions » (black line 
in Figure 3) : traditional renewables were 
replaced by coal between 1850 and 1920. 
Coal reached its maximum market share 
shortly before 1920 and was then progressi-
vely replaced by oil and natural gas between 
1920 and 1970. Since then, structural 
change in the global primary energy mix 
has been comparatively modest. 
Because of the long lifetimes of power 
plants, refineries, and other energy invest-
ments, there is not enough capital stock tur-
nover in the scenarios prior to 2020 to 
allow them to diverge significantly. Bur the 
seeds of the post - 2020 divergence in the 
structure of energy systems will have been 
widely sown by then based on RD&D 
efforts, intervening investments, and tech-
nology diffusion strategies. It is these deci-
sions between now and 2020 that will 
determine which of the diverging post -
2020 development paths will materialize. 
The transition away from oil and gas pro-
gresses relatively slowly in Scenario Al 
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FIGURE 3 - Evolution of world primary energy structure : shares of oil/gas, coal, and renewables/nuclear. 
Historical development 1950-1990 {triangles) and scenarios to 2020 (open circles), 
2050 (diamonds) and 2100 (closed circles). For explanation see text. 
Oil/ gas 
100%'-~__:v:._~~~!!=~~:......!!:~{__~~ 0% 
0% 20% 40% 
Coal 
60% 80% 100% 
Renewables I nuclear 
and gases) demanded by the high-income 
consumers of the second half of the 21 sr 
century. 
For each of the six scenarios, the level of 
energy use and rhe strucrure of energy sup-
ply, as summarized above (Table 1 and 
Figure 3), derermine future carbon emis-
sions. Figure 4 shows the resulrs in terms of 
both gross and net carbon emissions from 
fossil fuels (2). 
As shown in Figure 4, gross and net energy-
related carbon emissions vary substantially 
among the scenarios. The range of emis-
sions is particularly large in rhe rhree Case A 
scenarios. In Scenario Al, they reach 
14 GtC (net) per year in 2100, and in the 
(2) One of the (many) methodological refinements represented 
by the /IASA-WEC scenarios is an improved accounting of 
energy-related carbon emissions differentiating between 
« gross 11 and << net » emissions (for a discussion see Griibler 
and Nakicenovic, 1996). « Gross 11 fossil carbon emissions in a 
given year include all C02 associated with fossil energy 
resources extracted and used in that year irrespective of the 
conversion process chosen and whether the C02 is real~ emit-
ted to the atmosphere. Converse~, « net 11 fossil carbon emis-
sions refer to C02 released immediate~ to the atmosphere 
through burning fossil fuels. Net emissions are calculated by 
deducting C02 associated with non-energy purposes (feed-
stocks) and C02 that is «scrubbed 11 during electricity genera-
tion and synthetic fuel production and subsequeney stored per-
manency (e.g., in depleted gas fields), as occurs in Case C, or 
that is sequestered through reinjection for enhanced oil reco-
very (as occurs already at present in the USA, and happens on 
a large scale in Scenario A I). 
where oil and gas are assumed to be plenti-
ful as a resulr of rechnological progress in 
recovery and economics of unconventional 
oil and gas resources. In Scenario A3 and 
Case C, ir progresses more rapidly due ro 
fasrer rechnological progress in posr-fossil 
rechnologies (« bio-nuc » Scenario A3) or 
because energy and environmental policies 
favor rhe development of non-fossil alrerna-
rives and energy conservarion (Case C). In 
rhese cases rhe global energy sysrem could 
come almosr full circle by the end of the 
21st century. As in 18 50 ar the beginning of 
rhe Industrial Revolurion, it relies predomi-
nantly on non-fossil energy forms, bur these 
are high-technology renewables and advan-
ced nuclear power rather than the traditio-
nal biomass fuels used 250 years earlier. In 
Scenario A2 and Case B, the transirion 
away from conventional oil and gas 
includes an important contribution from 
coal, whose long-term market share after 
2050 ranges berween 20 and 40 percent. 
Nonetheless, little of rhis coal is used 
directly. Instead, it is convened to the high-
quality energy carriers (electricity, liquids, 
FIGURE 4 - Global carbon emissions from fossil fuel use, 1850 to 1990, 
and for scenarios to 2100 (inGtC). 
~ 
(.!) 
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For each scenario, the range shows the difference between gross and net emissions 
(see text for explanation) 
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coal-inrensive Scenario A2, they reach 
20 GrC per year. In the « bio-nuc »Scenario 
A.3, as a result of significant structural 
change in energy supply, they come to only 
6 GtC per year, roughly the level of emis-
sions today. The difference is that energy 
consumption in Scenario A3 in 2100 is five 
rimes greater than in 1990, with approxi-
mately the same level of emissions. Case B's 
emissions are very close to those of Scenario 
A3 up to about 2050 but then increase to 
nearly twice the Scenario A3 level by 2100. 
The two Case C scenarios as a result of cli-
mate policies stabilize global emissions at 
1990 levels by the mid-21st century in 
order to reach emission levels of some 
2 GrC by 2100. As such, only the Case C 
scenarios describe a long-term emission 
path leading to stabilization of atmospheric 
C02 concentrations at some 450 ppmv by 
the end of the 21st century. Scenario A3 
also could reach stabilization at 550 ppmv 
towards the middle of the 22nd century 
assuming a continuation of its downward 
sloping emission trend after 2100. 
It should be emphasized that emissions in 
the six scenarios are in most cases below 
levels of typical « baseline » or « business-as-
usual » scenarios developed within the cli-
mate community. Only in Scenario A2 are 
cumulative (1990 to 2100) carbon emis-
sions above those in the IPCC's IS92a refe-
rence scenario (Pepper et al., 1992). The 
generally lower emissions in the scenarios 
presented here are due to technological 
dynamics in the energy sector that are 
incorporated when the analysis is done in 
greater technological detail. From this pers-
pective, typical baseline scenarios appear 
more as contrived, special cases than as 
potentially likely outcomes. They combine 
optimism about high economic growth 
with general pessimism about technological 
change and resource availability, except for 
coal production. The IIASA-WEC study 
concludes that the scenarios describe more 
consistent possible futures. They march 
high economic growth with technological 
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changes that enlarge the resource base (par-
ticularly in the case of clean conventional 
oil and gas), that improve alternative energy 
supply sources, and that permit structural 
changes toward clean energy carriers. As 
such, the widely differing C02 emissions 
depicted by the IIASA-WEC scenarios per-
haps illustrate best the powers of technolo-
gical change in lessening or amplifying 
humanity's ecological « footprint » on the 
planer. This raises anew the question of a 
better understanding of the mechanisms 
and patterns of technological change before 
ultimately venturing to design policies to 
influence it in a particular, e.g. ecologically 
more benign, direction. 
Ill. - INSIDE THE « BLACK BOX » 
OF TECHNOLOGY 
A review of the literature (e.g. Freeman, 
1994) and historical, empirical observations 
(e.g. Gri.ibler, 1998) suggest the following 
simplified taxonomy of most salient charac-
teristics of technological change as : dyna-
mic, cumulative, systemic, and uncertain. 
Their consideration enables to begin to 
open the« black box» (Rosenberg, 1982) of 
technology. A brief summary is given below 
how above major characteristics of techno-
logical change were incorporated into the 
IIASA-WEC scenarios. 
Foremost it is important to emphasize that 
the IIASA-WEC study - contrary to most 
(short-term) energy studies - treats techno-
logical change as inherently dynamic. This 
results both from the long time horizon 
adopted as well as recent methodological 
advances achieved at IIASA. These include 
the large energy technology inventory 
C02DB (Messner and Srrubegger, 1991) 
that enables a statistical representation of 
technological uncertainties (Strubegger and 
Reitgruber, 1995) as well as novel mathe-
matical and algorithmic approaches in the 
modeling of endogenous technological 
change (for a review see Gri.ibler et al., 
1999). Adopting a Schumpeterian (1934) 
perspective, the technology life cycle is 
conceptualized as consisting of four succes-
sive phases : invention (discovery of princi-
pal feasibility of a new solution), innovation 
(first establishment of an organized mar-
ket), niche market applications, and in case 
all earlier stages prove successful, potential 
for pervasive diffusion. Recognizing the 
considerable time lags involved, energy 
options that are not technically feasible 
today (i.e. have even not reached their 
invention stage) are excluded in the study. 
Nuclear fusion, for example, is excluded, 
while hydrogen is included as an energy car-
rier because it can be produced with current 
technologies, although not yet at competi-
tive costs. New and emerging technologies 
were also kept as generic as possible in the 
study, both out of modeling economy as 
well as to avoid the trap of prematurely pic-
king winners. With exception of mature 
technologies (e.g. conventional steam-cycle 
coal fired power plants) all technologies are 
treated as dynamic, with rates and direction 
of technological change adopted being sce-
nario specific. 
Secondly, the scenarios reflect the cumula-
tive nature of technological change. A new 
technological artifact, like a new biological 
species, is seldom designed from« scratch». 
New technology is deeply rooted in the 
experience and knowledge gained by desi-
gning its predecessors. Technological know-
ledge is thus largely cumulative (subject 
however to knowledge depreciation discus-
sed below). Knowledge as applied in pro-
duction also exhibits cumulativeness: initial 
defects become progressively eliminated as 
production volumes progress, costs fall, 
model varieties and regional product diffe-
rentiations are introduced, etc. In short, 
cumulativeness implies the possibility of 
increasing returns. The most popular 
example in the technological literature 
being manufacturing « learning » or « expe-
rience » curves (Argote and Epple, 1990, 
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Christiansson, 1995, Goldemberg, 1996, 
Neij, 1997) as illustrated in Figure 5. In 
essence, the scenarios of the IIASA-WEC 
study emphasize that improved technology 
does not come as a free good. It requires 
continued dedicated efforts and invest-
ments into both the disembodied (R&D) 
and embodied (new plant and equipment) 
aspects of technology. 
It is important also to recall that whilst 
technological knowledge is cumulative, it 
also depreciates if not applied (or applied in 
a « stop and go » fashion). To paraphrase 
Rosegger (1996) : the corollary of « lear-
ning-by-doing» (Arrow, 1962) is « forget-
ting-by-not-doing » as empirical examples 
from the aircraft (Epple et al., 1996, 
Michina, 1999) and energy industries (e.g. 
Watanabe 1995 on solar PVs, and Cohn, 
1997 on nuclear reactors) demonstrate. 
In each scenario of the IIASA-WEC study, 
technological change reflects the scenario's 
distinctive choices, leading to an increasing 
divergence of development paths among 
the six scenarios. Both the high-growth 
Case A and the ecologically driven Case C 
contain multiple scenario branches within a 
single pattern of overall development. In 
each case, the difference between branches 
leading to different directions of technolo-
gical change is path dependent ; early 
investments and initial steps in one direc-
tion reduce the costs and obstacles of conti-
nuing in that direction. The performance 
and competitiveness of future technologies, 
and indeed the path that the global and 
regional energy systems take, is thus shaped 
by RD&D choices and early investments in 
new technologies and infrastructures. 
Future development depends on the path of 
technological learning, experimentation, 
and cumulative experience taken in each 
scenario. In each, the future becomes 
increasingly locked into a particular techno-
logical development paradigm - some are 
. . . 
resource mtens1ve, some are environmen-
tally benign. 
No technology is an island, as depending 
on numerous other technologies both up-
and downstream and especially on infra-
HGURE 5 - Technology learning curves : improvement of investment costs ($/kW) 
as a function of accumulated experience (cumulative MW installed) 
~ 
o D RD&D phase 
20000r---,,......------------------~ 
1983 
• Commercialization 
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~2000 ~-----=-~l--_.::_ ___ ..:.._ ______ ____j 
0 
"' "' 
-~ 1000 f------~c-------"'""°'=------------l 
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200 f----------- flearn ing rate - 20':o. - 10%i __ ____, 
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10 100 1000 
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structures. The IIASA-WEC study conside-
red the systemic aspects of technological 
change, or technological interrelatedness, 
through a systematic exploration of the 
most important technology linkages in the 
energy sector. This was done using the 
detailed, bottom-up energy systems model 
MESSAGE III, developed at llASA 
(Messner and Strubegger, 1995). As a 
result, the study identified in particular 
important infrastructural bottlenecks as of 
critical importance such as the need to 
develop extensive gas and electricity infra-
structures in the rapidly growing coal eco-
nomies of Asia (see also Nakicenovic, 
1998). The study also argued that such 
long-term infrastructure investments that 
aim to avoid technological « lock-in » in 
carbon and sulfur intensive energy systems 
should be prime candidates for targeted 
investment under the flexibility and Clean 
Development Mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
Due to innovation - diffusion lags, techno-
logical interdependence, and infrastructure 
needs (network externalities), rates of 
change in large-scale energy systems are 
necessarily slow. This implies acting sooner 
rather than later as a contingency policy to 
respond to long-term social, economic and 
environmental uncertainties (Griibler and 
Messner, 1998). 
Finally, the llASA-WEC study considered 
technological uncertainty (Rosenberg, 1996) 
through a scenario approach. A novel 
approach was adopted in which all available 
technology data were pooled into a single 
data bank, the C02 DB technology inven-
tory containing some 1,600 technologies. 
These data were then analyzed statistically 
to obtain empirical measures of representa-
tive ranges of cost variations of current and 
future energy technologies (Strubegger and 
Reitgruber, 1995). Near-term technology 
costs assumed for the three cases were deri-
ved from the medians of the empirical cost 
distributions. Lower ranges from the statis-
tical frequency distributions defined the 
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scope for future cost reductions that occur 
at different rates in the three cases ( optimis-
tic in Cases A and C, and more cautious in 
Case B). At the time of performing the 
modeling work underlying the IIASA-
WEC study, methodologies and models 
were insufficiently developed to deal with 
the large scale computational problems 
(I I regions, 11 time steps, and treatment of 
hundreds of different technologies) invol-
ved in the endogenous treatment of techno-
logical change and uncertainty. (In the 
meantime, algorithmic and computational 
limitations have been largely overcome, cf 
Grirsevskyi and Ermoliev, 1999.) Thus, 
uncertain future technology improvements 
were considered in the IIASA-WEC study 
primarily via varying exogenous technology 
assumptions. An iterative modeling proce-
dure was applied to assure consistency bet-
ween a scenario's technology dynamics and 
the underlying investment and diffusion 
profiles (see Gri.ibler et al., 1999), consis-
tent with the conceptual model of techno-
logical learning curves outlined above. As a 
result, all scenarios display features of shorr-
term anticipatory investments into techno-
logical innovation and gradually expanding 
niche marker applications of technologies 
that have considerable long-term marker 
potentials. The scenarios also aim to mini-
mize depreciation of technological know-
ledge, i.e. « forgetting-by-not-doing », in 
the short-term for options that are of strate-
gic importance in the long-term. This 
aspect of the scenarios is perhaps the one in 
most stark contrast to customary short-
rerm to medium-term energy studies (e.g. 
IEA, 1998). Ir is also the area where rhe sce-
narios differ most from the current domi-
nant business ideology, emphasizing short-
term profits and investments into mergers 
and acquisitions, rather than the build up of 
long-term strategic options and investments 
into technological innovation. 
380 
IV.-ENERGYTECHNOLOGIES 
INTHE 21sr CENTURY 
Innovation and technology diffusion 
require that both opportunities are percei-
ved and that the entrepreneurial spirit exists 
to pursue them. Long-term scenarios can-
not forecast future technological « win-
ners », but they can indicate areas of tech-
nological opportunity. Figure 6 illustrates 
for 2020, 2050, and 2100 the global mar-
ket potential in the IIASA-WEC scenarios 
for four classes of energy technologies : new 
end-use energy devices (e.g. PVs, fuel cells, 
hear pumps), power plants, synfuel produc-
tion (from biomass, coal, and natural gas), 
and energy transport, transmission, and dis-
tribution infrastructures. For each of the 
four classes, the minimum, maximum, and 
average market potential for the six scena-
rios are shown. (Greater technological detail 
is shown in Figure 8). 
Across the wide variation in possible energy 
developments depicted in the six scenarios, 
the importance of energy infrastructures 
grows persistently. Even in the low-demand 
scenarios of Case C, energy infrastructures 
deliver at least 10 Gtoe per year by 2050. By 
the end of the century they average 20 Groe 
per year across all six scenarios, reaching 
close to 40 Gtoe per year in the highest sce-
narios. 
Infrastructures are the backbone of rhe 
energy system, and the IIASA-WEC study 
indicates that requirements for new infra-
structures will be vast indeed. Urban and 
rural poor need to get connected to energy 
grids in order to have access to modern 
energy services. New decentralized energy 
options can help to reduce costs in rural 
areas, but currently high costs need to be 
brought down through R&D efforts as well 
as stepped-up experience gained in niche 
marker applications. Improved intercon-
nections of energy grids for natural gas and 
electricity on a continental scale remains a 
task ahead for many regions in particular 
Asia, Latin America, and in the longer-
term, also Africa. A recent IIASA study 
(Nakicenovic, 1998) has investigated the 
energy infrastructure needs in Eurasia based 
FIGURE 6 - Global market potential for four dusters of energy technologies by 2020, 2050, 
and 2100 (in Gtoe). Minima, maxima, an average across the six scenarios 
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on the demand projections of the IIASA-
WEC scenarios. New infrastructures are 
needed in Eurasia, in particular, to match 
the large available resources of oil and gas in 
the Caspian region and Siberia with the 
newly emerging centers of energy 
consumption in Asia. The trade implica-
tions of new energy infrastructures in 
Eurasia are illustrated for natural gas in 
Figure 7 for 2050. To put these illustrative 
trade flows into perspective : gas imports to 
Western Europe in 1995 amounted to some 
90 million tons oil equivalent (Mtoe), com-
pared to possible trade flows of up to 
500 Mtoe (Europe) and 700 Mtoe (Asia) 
that could be realized with a new continen-
tal gas infrastructures. Realization of such 
infrastructure projects will take many 
decades and multi-billion investments. 
Without a long-term perspective, both 
potentials, as well as realization horizons of 
such big energy infrastructure projects, can-
not be studied. The flexibility and Clean 
Development mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol could provide new opportunities 
in financing new energy infrastructures and 
development of cleaner energy supply struc-
tures, in order to avoid a technological 
« lock-in » in carbon and sulfur-intensive 
coal based economies, particularly in Asia. 
The markets for power sector technologies 
also grow substantially, with a wide spread 
between the maximum and minimum sce-
narios (see Figure 6 above). By 2050, the 
range is between 3 toe per year (energy deli-
vered) and 14 toe per year. Part of this 
spread relates to uncertainties about 
demand growth, but part of the spread 
arises from energy end-use innovations in 
the form of new, on-sire decentralized elec-
tricity generation technologies such as pho-
tovoltaics or fuel cells. The potential for 
end-use technologies in the long term out-
grows that of the power sector. The most 
important customers for energy rechnolo-
FIGURE 7 - Natural gas trade within Eurasia in 2050 assuming high demand growth 
and the availabiliy of transcontinental infrastructure grids. Flows denote pipelines (blue) 
and LNG (yellow) routes. Width of trade « arrows » are proportional to gas flows (in Mtoe), 
areas of regions are proportional to primary energy use in 2050 (see figure 2) 
Source : Nakicenol'ic ( 1998) 
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gies would no longer be a limited number 
of utility managers but rather millions of 
energy consumers worldwide. Synfuels also 
emerge in the long term as a major techno-
logy market (cf. Figure 6 above). An orderly 
transition away from conventional oil and 
gas translates into large technology markets 
for synliquids, syngas, and, in the long 
term, hydrogen produced from both fossil 
fuels (coal and natural gas) and renewables 
(biomass). By the end of the 21st century 
the global synfuels marker could be at least 
4 Gtoe per year, comparable to the current 
oil market. 
The marker potential in the 21st century 
for energy technologies in the form of infra-
structures, power plants, synfuel produc-
tion, and decentralized end-use devices is 
thus indeed large. Yet, the IIASA-WEC 
study indicates that the diffusion of new 
energy technologies will rake many decades, 
with only modest and gradual deployment 
up to 2020. In that respect, the study 
confirms the overall S-shaped pattern of 
technological diffusion (Rogers, 1983 ; 
Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979 ; 
Griibler, 1998) : slow growth at the begin-
ning, followed by massive marker penetra-
tion, eventually leading to market satura-
tion. Ranges for individual technologies are 
illustrated in Figure 8 for 2020 and 2050. 
Mindful of the dangers of trying to « pick 
winners», and consistent with the aggregate 
representation of technology in the IIASA-
WEC study, only generic technologies are 
listed in Figure 8. For instance, the study 
does not distinguish between solid oxide, 
molten carbonate, phosphoric acid, and 
solid polymer fuel cells. Opportunities for 
hybrid and transitional technologies are also 
wide open - on-board steam reforming, for 
example, or partial oxidation could provide 
hydrogen for fuel cell vehicles while conti-
nuing to use existing oil distribution infra-
structures. 
The conclusion, that the point of final 
energy use is where the IIASA-WEC scena-
rios expect far-reaching technological 
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FIGURE 8 - Market potentials for energy technologies (in Gtoe) by 2020 and 2050 
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improvemenrs to occur, has two additional 
implications. First, it weakens the argument 
for extensive R&D investments in large, 
sophisticated, « lumpy », and inflexible 
technologies such as fusion power and cen-
tralized solar thermal power plants. 
Improvements in end-use technologies, 
where millions, rather than hundreds, of 
units are produced and used, are more ame-
nable to standardization, modularization, 
mass production, and hence exploitation of 
learning-curve effects (read : cost reductions 
and performance improvements). Second, 
institutional arrangements that govern final 
energy use and supply are critical. 
Deregulation and liberalization of electri-
city markers can create incentives in this 
direction as service packages are tailored to 
various consumer preferences and especially 
as traditional consumers can sell electricity 
back to the grid. But there are also concerns 
that liberalization will discourage long term 
R&D by emphasizing short-term profits as 
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indeed seems to happen in a number of 
OECD countries. Private R&D is declining 
along with public R&D, with private sector 
investments in energy-related R&D, for 
example, falling by nearly a third in the 
USA in the past five years (Yeager, 1998). In 
the UK, the privatized offsprings of the 
Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) combined spend less than half of 
the R&D of the previous CEGB 
(Cunningham, 1998). 
CONCLUSION 
The IIASA-WEC study has identified tech-
nology as a crucial variable for long-term 
energy systems development. The most 
important challenges include meeting long-
term energy demand growth in developing 
countries, assuring large-scale infrastructure 
investments, maintaining a strong and 
diversified RD&D and technology portfo-
lio, as well as to devise new institutional 
mechanisms for technology development 
and diffusion for instance through the flexi-
bility and Clean Development mechanisms 
of the Kyoto Protocol. In essence, it is only 
through improved technology that the 
imperatives of social and economic deve-
lopment as well as environmental preserva-
tion can be reconciled. Three technology-
specific conclusions from the IIASA-WEC 
study deserve particular attention : 
Technological change drives productivity 
growth and economic development. 
Drawing on human ingenuity, technology 
is a man-made, renewable resource, as long 
as it is properly nurtured. Bur progress has a 
price. R&D of new energy technologies 
and the accumulation of experience in 
niche markets (and their combination into 
RD&D) require upfront expenditures of 
money and effort. These are increasingly 
viewed as too high a price to pay in liberali-
zed markets where the maximization of 
short-term shareholder value and invest-
ments into mergers and acquisitions rake 
precedence over the build up of long-term 
strategic options and investments into tech-
nological innovation. Yet, it is the RD&D 
investments of the next few decades that 
will shape the technology options available 
after 2020. A robust hedging strategy 
focuses on generic technologies at the inter-
face between energy supply and end use, 
including gas turbines, fuel cells, and pho-
tovoltaics. These could become as impor-
tant as today's gasoline engines, electric 
motors, and microchips according to the 
IIASA-WEC study. 
Capital turnover rates in end-use applica-
tions are comparatively short - one to two 
decades. Therefore, pervasive changes can 
be implemented rather quickly, and missed 
opportunities may be revisited. Conversely, 
the lifetimes of energy supply technologies, 
and particularly of infrastructures, are five 
decades or longer. Thus, at most one or two 
replacements can occur during the next 
century. Betting on the wrong horse will 
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have serious, possibly irreversible conse-
quences. The RD&D and investment deci-
sions made now and in the immediate 
future will determine which long-term 
options become available after 2020 and 
which are foreclosed. Initiating long-term 
changes requires action sooner rather than 
later, as rates of change in global energy sys-
tems are slow. 
Despite energy globalization, market exclu-
sion remains a serious challenge. To date, 
some two billion people do not have access 
to modern energy services due to poverty 
and a lack of energy infrastructures. Many 
regions are overly dependent on a single, 
locally available resource, such as traditional 
fuelwood or coal, and have limited access to 
the clean flexible energy forms required for 
economic and social development. Policies 
to deregulate markets and get « prices 
right ,, ignore the poor. Even the best func-
tioning energy markets will not reach those 
who cannot pay. Evidently, energy policies 
cannot fully address this issue. But what 
energy policies can accomplish is the 
improvement of old infrastructures - the 
backbone of the energy system - and the 
development of new ones. New infrastruc-
tures are needed in Eurasia, in particular, to 
match the large available resources of oil 
and gas in the Caspian region and Siberia 
with the newly emerging centers of energy 
Revue de l'Energie, n ° 508, juillet-aout I 999 
consumption in Asia. Extended intercon-
nections are also needed in Latin America 
and Africa. New, more decentralized energy 
technologies may lessen the economic bur-
den of constructing traditional infrastruc-
ture grids, but they require their own 
« infrastructure » : most notably a strong 
science and technology base in developing 
countries. New institutional arrangements, 
drawing for instance on the flexibility and 
Clean Development mechanisms of the 
Kyoto protocol, should be explored to fur-
ther infrastructure investments that are by 
their very nature, huge, risky, and with 
long-term payback only. 
Finally, the results of the IIASA-WEC study 
also provide for some methodological les-
sons for future generation of energy models 
and scenarios. First, the study results ques-
tion the commonly used practice of assu-
ming « business as usual ,, type of develop-
ments, that technologically most often sim-
ply translate into devising a future that sim-
ply is just « more of the same » as existing 
today. Second, uncertainties need to be 
explicitly considered. Whereas scenarios, 
such as those described here, elucidate the 
impacts of alternative technological deve-
lopments, they offer only limited guidance 
of (( robust )) strategies vis a vis uncertainty. 
Technology portfolio analysis, hedging stra-
tegies, and models of decisions under 
uncertainty are methodological next steps. 
For the latter, new methodologies are being 
developed at IIASA including advances in 
stochastic programming (e.g. Messner et al., 
1996, Gri.ibler and Messner, 1996). Finally, 
it is important to recognize that technology 
does not come as a free good. In addition, 
although a methodological nightmare for 
traditional deterministic planning models, 
there is overwhelming evidence that tech-
nological innovation can exhibit features of 
increasing returns (implying non-convexi-
ties in the language of optimization 
models) . Fortunately again new methodo-
logies are becoming available to consider 
these in energy models (e.g. Messner, 1995 
and 1996), including a new generation of 
models that treat technological learning 
phenomena as highly uncertain (e.g. 
Gri.ibler et al., 1999 ; Gritsevskyi and 
Ermoliev, 1999). 
The elements of progressively opening the 
« black box » of technology are thus there : 
now it's the task of the analytical and policy 
community to revisit traditional approaches 
and conceptions. Abandoning the linear 
model of innovation, explicit considera-
tions of uncertainty, and a better unders-
tanding of the mechanism that govern 
increasing returns to technological innova-
tion may be good first steps I 
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